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Reading Responsibly between Martha Nussbaum and Emmanuel Levinas: 
Towards a Textual Ethics for the Twenty-First Century 
 
Introduction: “a quarrel of long standing” 
In Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (1990), Martha Nussbaum 
observes an interdisciplinary move whereby literary theory and philosophy both now 
investigate questions of epistemology and metaphysics. Yet for Nussbaum, there remains a 
“striking absence: the absence, from literary theory, of the organizing questions of moral 
philosophy” (170). Nussbaum’s critique in Love’s Knowledge is indicative of a blinding rift 
between the so-called “Analytic” and “Continental” traditions through the second half of the 
twentieth century. Driven perhaps into competing critical camps by the cultural forces of 
humanist and post-structuralist persuasions there has been little productive debate between 
these parallel forms of knowledge in departments either of Literary Studies or of Philosophy. 
But the challenge to a more thorough interdisciplinary engagement is to recognize that the 
literary theory that includes epistemology and metaphysics is also fundamentally concerned 
with ethics. Indeed, the strand of ethical criticism emergent in Continental philosophy – since 
Emmanuel Levinas first championed “ethics as first philosophy” (Levinas 1989, 75) – 
grounds metaphysics in ethics. In Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature (1999), Jill 
Robbins summarizes the paradigm shift: 
Within recent Continental philosophy, Emmanuel Levinas has decisively renewed the 
question of the ethical. In a manner somewhat analogous to Heidegger’s retrieval of 
the forgotten question of being, Levinas repeats and revisits an entire philosophical 
tradition from the vantage point of the forgetting of the ethical. (1999, xiii) 
In an ambitious gesture, this article invites interdisciplinary literary studies to re-examine the 
meta-language of literary criticism and to re-frame the question of ethics debated by the 
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philosophers and the poets since the sixth century BC. By bringing into comparative analysis 
the major works of two of the most significant philosophers of the twentieth century, Martha 
Nussbaum and Emmanual Levinas, a claim is made for a methodical working through of their 
philosophical differences. The article thereby embarks on the design of a roadmap to bridge 
Analytic and Continental philosophy and to set out the direction for a better understanding of 
the textual encounter, that is, reading as an ethical work with the text providing the structural 
relations between self and other in language. Furthermore, it is by advancing the term 
“textual ethics” that both epistemology and subjectivity are recognized as a process of 
intertextuality, but only in a language (in discourse as in aesthetics) for which we are 
responsible – a language that ultimately is perceived by, reimagined, and profoundly speaks 
of us as – social human beings. In Textual Ethos Studies, or Locating Ethics (2005), Anna 
Fahraeus clarifies this new approach to ethical criticism: 
The production of ethos – as a position or manner of relating to the world in terms of 
an ethics – occurs in the encounter with the text. This means that the ethos of a text is 
not seen as (wholly) autonomously present and extractable without the subject but as 
heterogeneously produced in the temporal process of reading. (2005, 13-14) 
Rather than positioning the counter-traditions of Analytic and Continental philosophy, 
represented here by Nussbaum and Levinas, as determining opposite understandings of this 
textual encounter, this article hopes to show how they are both required for a literary 
criticism that is socially responsible, and that has a social value beyond its own self-reflexive 
or aesthetic investigations. Indeed, it is in defense of the humanities that a very old question 
at the heart of the English discipline is currently recharged, that is, the question of the ethical 
grounding of literary criticism itself. In this, the imperative is made clear: contemporary 
society needs, not only, as Paul Benneworth suggests, a “new morality of public governance” 
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(2013, n.p.) but, most urgently, it is concluded, a reworked textual ethics for the twenty-first 
century. 
 
The Turn to Ethics in Literary Criticism: Martha Nussbaum’s Ethical Appeal 
 
The question of literature’s ethical power first reemerged in the birth pains of a modern 
English discipline in the early twentieth century, and it is a question that continues to be 
debated whenever the purpose of that discipline is properly considered. Over the last thirty 
years, in particular, there has been a rigorous attempt to address the foundational question of 
the ethics of literary criticism. Alongside many important book-length studies and recent 
anthologies of literary ethics, key moments of critical reflection and advance in this thirty-
year period are the essays brought together in the special issues of New Literary History 
(1983), Ethics (1988), Literature and Philosophy (1998), PMLA (1999), and Poetics Today 
(2004). A first pioneer, it was a decision by Ralph Cohen in 1983 (then editor of New 
Literary History) which introduced a vigorous debate concerning the nature of the 
relationship between literature and moral philosophy. Bringing together a number of key 
voices in ethical criticism for a special issue entitled “Literature and/as Moral Philosophy,” 
its central piece is a now famous essay on Henry James’ The Golden Bowl (1904) by the 
literary critic, humanitarian advisor, and distinguished Professor of Law and Ethics at 
University of Chicago, Martha Nussbaum. In addressing the possibility of a co-disciplinarity 
between philosophy and literary studies, and with Nussbaum’s work as its centerpiece, New 
Literary History provoked a significant re-thinking of the fundamental questions of 
definition, purpose, and meaning. Murray Krieger’s essay adopted the widest context 
provocatively calling out an “aesthetic disinterestedness” and “philosophical deterioration” 
within literary criticism alongside the “skepticism of semiotic studies” and a “loss of 
ontological security” (1983, 121). For the contributors to New Literary History in 1983, 
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literary criticism had reached a crisis point, unable to deal with moral and ethical 
considerations. 
In a later book entitled Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life   
(1995), Nussbaum followed up on these arguments to describe the phenomenological 
moment that raises the ontological, political, and social questions resonant throughout her 
scholarly work. She writes: 
Consider, now, what it is to see a human being. Perception represents a physical 
object, possibly in motion. It has a certain shape, rather like the one we ascribe to 
ourselves. Well, how do we really know what sort of physical object this is and how 
to behave toward it? (1995, 38) 
Nussbaum’s complex and multi-faceted body of work often begins with this most basic and 
universal experience, and indeed, with the questions it raises. For the interhuman moment is a 
profound and natural experience: it marks the beginnings of the existential, opens the 
individual to new possibilities, and it is the prerequisite of relationship, the inaugural moment 
of responsibility. As Nussbaum writes in Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the 
Humanities (2010), crucial in this interhuman moment is “the ability to see people as human 
beings, not simply as objects” (6). And yet, she suggests, “we seem to be forgetting… what it 
is to approach another person as a soul, rather than as a mere useful instrument” (6). Thus 
Nussbaum rejects both a Kantian ethics (to ask, in a given situation, “what is my moral 
duty?”) as well as Utilitarianism in the ethical life (to ask, “How shall I maximize utility?). 
For Nussbaum, both these questions separate ethics off from the nature of the individual, or 
from individual moral character, and in their material pragmatism neglect any account of the 
(moral) imagination (Nussbaum 1990, 173). 
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 The subtle brilliance of Nussbaum’s Aristotelian ethics is that she focuses clearly on 
the moral actions rather than on the morality of the agent, while, at the same time, it is the 
morality of those actions that in her ethics provides for moral character. Nussbaum writes:  
To become a person of just character is to develop patterns of desire and concern that 
will motivate one, in a wide variety of circumstances, to choose the just action for its 
own sake; it is also to develop abilities of perception and vision that will enable one to 
discern, in a wide variety of concrete circumstances, what the just action might be. 
(1988, 333) 
This philosophically adept maneuver makes the virtuous disposition of the subject “morally 
transparent” in order to focus on the actions themselves as determinant of moral character 
(1988, 334). The philosophical introspection and hermeneutical skepticism regarding 
autonomous subjectivity that haunts much poststructuralist thinking is thus avoided. In 
Character, Virtue Theories, and the Vices (1999), Christine McKinnon summarizes 
Nussbaum’s position: “A self-conscious attempt to develop a moral character need not be 
characterized by this kind of self-reflexive concern” (227). 
But what is the process whereby human beings develop the capacity for mutual 
recognition? For Nussbaum, the cognitive faculty and emotional capacity required in the 
interhuman moment is enabled most efficiently in the process of reading literary fiction. It is 
in reading works of fiction that the citizen can exercise what Nussbaum calls, “the narrative 
imagination” (2010, 95). Without this, she argues, “factual knowledge and logic” are of little 
use; rather it is by exploring fictional works that the science of narrative is comprehended 
together with the process whereby “a narrative is assembled from evidence” (95). Beginning 
with the universal phenomena of the face-to-face experience and the intimate engagement of 
reading literary fiction, this was the philosophical wager of Nussbaum’s 1983 article “Flawed 
Crystals,” setting out her principle belief that it is in the characterization of sophisticated 
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emotional and rational responses that the reader finds the ethics of the literary work 
elucidated. Analyzing reader-response, for example, she writes: 
It is only when, as here, we study the loves and attentions of a finely responsive mind 
such as Maggie’s, through all the contingent complexities of a tangled human life, 
that the force of these ideas begins to make itself felt. (1983, 41) 
In reading the works of Henry James, Nussbaum had observed “an intelligent maker of a 
moral vision who embodied it in novels because only in that form could he fully and fittingly 
express it” (1983, 44). Drawing on her in-depth knowledge of “the Socratic assessment 
process” (1983, 45) in combination with a philosophical neo-humanist teleology of the 
individual life, Nussbaum described a moral theory of literature and a practice of reading that 
fostered “the narrative imagination” (1983, 95). In the experience of reading a novel with a 
complex set of moral problems and competing personal involvements, as in the case of 
James’s novels, Nussbaum explains that there is required “an activity of exploration and 
unraveling that uses abilities… emotion and imagination,” which are “important parts of the 
moral assessment process” (1983, 45). As she later amplifies in Poetic Justice: “it gets the 
readers involved with the characters… their hopes and fears,” and in this way helps readers 
“to acknowledge their own world and to choose more reflectively in it” (1995, 31). 
It is not incidental that the literary work takes on an ethical dimension for Nussbaum 
in the combination of the “exploratory power” of the novel to narrate the “length and breadth 
of a human life” and the “presence of a character who will count as a high case of the human 
response to value” (1983, 41). In Love’s Knowledge, Nussbaum develops this theme to give 
an account of the imperative for her investigations into the ethics of literature. First, 
Nussbaum explains that her interest begins “from the fact that, like David Copperfield, I was 
a child whose best friends were, on the whole, novels – a serious and, for a long time, solitary 
child” (1990, 11). This experience fused with her academic pursuits in adulthood as a scholar 
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of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. Nussbaum, as I have suggested, works from what 
she calls “the Aristotelian procedure” (1990, 24), at the beginning historically, in fact, of the 
study of ethics, that is, with Aristotle’s attempt to answer the questions posed by Socrates and 
Plato in his Nicomachean Ethics. Central to Nussbaum’s ethical thought are Aristotle’s two 
Greek terms, eudaimonia, the happiness or flourishing of a human being and, arête, the 
virtues or excellence through which such aspiration is fulfilled. Nussbaum finds in the 
“Aristotelian procedure” what she calls an “inclusive dialectical method” (unlike the Kantian 
or Utilitarian perspectives) by which all forms of behavior may be assessed within a holistic 
view of a lived experience (1990, 25). Nussbaum’s literary ethics thus emerges as a language 
of capabilities, rather than the more conventional language of human rights. Her public belief 
is thus in the developmental, primary value of childhood education and, in particular, literacy 
and reading, extending into adolescence and adulthood, and which contribute intrinsically 
towards a unity of character and the capacity for human flourishing. 
 A second key to Nussbaum’s ethical thought links back to the history of literary 
criticism, for it was at Harvard University in 1969 that she met with a “literary resistance” 
and “contempt” – “by no means unique to Harvard” – towards “ethical criticism of literature” 
(1990, 12). Indeed, Nussbaum’s ethical interest is cultivated from her “sense of the force and 
inevitability of certain questions” that were intentionally side-lined as “the New Criticism 
waned and Deconstruction took over” (1990, 10, 21). For Nussbaum, the reading of novels is 
part of “the searching we pursue” in order to understand how best to live and, indeed, a 
process that channels the force of persistent and fundamental questions of responsibility and 
political belief (1990, 24). Thus in describing the “Aristotelian procedure,” Nussbaum 
suggests that “one of the salient virtues of this method is its continuity with ‘our actual 
experience’ as we search for understanding” (1990, 25). It is, for her, a lifelong pursuit of 
personal morality in line with public responsibility, an argument that she advances in Poetic 
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Justice. Nussbaum writes: “literary works are… artificial constructions of some crucial 
elements in a norm of public rationality,” thereby providing ethical instruction for civil 
responsibility; “valuable guides,” as she suggests, “to correct response” (1995, 78). 
As philosopher, Nussbaum sees literature working through the reasoning of moral 
philosophy, and she argues that the moral guardian can find the rarified abstractions of 
philosophical discourse grounded in the world of the literary novel. Specific circumstances 
and particularities of the virtues (arêtes) may be given a character and emotional maturity; 
the possibility of a human flourishing (eudaimonia) is dramatized through the singularity of a 
character’s worldview. 1  Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the critic to re-examine the 
imaginary realm of the literary aesthetic and to champion it as literature’s unique capacity to 
replicate the multifold dimensions of its represented world. For the literary ethicist, the finest 
of this immersive media may transport us into the lives and experiences of others; it provides 
a world and a people living out human universals, a world into which the reader brings a 
committed empathy whilst maintaining a real world distance or detachment just as is 
considered necessary for effective moral evaluations. Using the multiple perspectives of a 
richly woven narrative, it is argued, the novel thus has a special capacity to draw us into 
moral deliberations. 
Wayne C. Booth’s The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction (1988) proved 
significant in popularizing this neo-humanistic, narrative mode of ethical criticism. Booth 
writes: “I cannot, as sophisticated reader, hope for Elizabeth Bennet’s marriage to Darcy or 
fear Tess Durbeyfield’s doom without my hoping and fearing those things” (205). Booth 
explains that it is by attending to the “patterning of who we are, for the duration” that we 
engage in the ethics of reading: “our interest here is in how we are shaped” (1988, 206). 
Nussbaum subsequently questioned the implied social act of both Booth’s “coduction” (that 
places evaluative judgments within a nested intertextuality), and his metaphor of friendship 
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(that equates a fictional character with a real person in terms of ethical experience).
2
 Indeed, 
for Nussbaum, Booth’s over-commitment to the subjectivism of aesthetic considerations 
leads him to a position of (moral) relativism that ultimately undercuts his project of an ethical 
criticism (“Wanting to accept and believe all candidates for truth,” Nussbaum concludes, “he 
reaches the verge of giving up on reason-based ethical judgment” [1989, 180]). Nonetheless, 
Nussbaum and Booth both argue that it is in the identification and mirror alignment of 
subjectivities that the reader enters into an exploration of morality that is character building.
 
The moral exemplars of a didactic, epistolary form will be less persuasive than the dilemmas 
present in the psychological depth of a character exhibiting both virtue and vice, but 
fundamentally both of these novelistic strategies will work together towards the social 
purpose of literature as an adjustment value of personhood. 
Nussbaum’s philosophical wager met its most forceful opposition at a meeting of the 
American Philosophical Association in 1998 and in papers by Richard Posner (with 
Nussbaum and Booth responding) published in Literature and Philosophy in 1997 and 1998. 
Whilst Posner represented a popular rejection of the ethical value of literature – “moral 
content… is merely the writer’s raw material” (1997, 7) he argued – he also made incisive 
criticisms of Nussbaum’s literary approach.3 Whilst Nussbaum and Booth eloquently defend 
their ethical positions in Literature and Philosophy, there are nonetheless several problems 
with Nussbaum’s literary ethics that cannot be resolved within its own logic. For whilst 
Nussbaum claims a fundamental inclusivity, her literary ethics is, on the contrary, fully 
proscriptive of a particular form (narrative) and of a single representational mode (mimesis). 
Furthermore, Nussbaum’s evaluative mode is proscriptive too of its ethics, that is, it works 
exclusively on the basis of an Aristotelian notion of individual well-being. 
 By focusing on “a certain type of narrative literature” (Nussbaum 1995, xvi) that 
which embodies the Socratic ideal by providing “visions of humanity, expressions of a 
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complete sense of a social life” (1995, 2) Nussbaum maps out “a distinctive alternative to 
Kantian and Utilitarian conceptions” (1990, 24). There is, however, a necessary selectivity in 
this method of ethical reading that would trouble more widely accepted conventions of 
literary criticism. For in proscribing a realist, narrative fiction, and an authorial perspective 
calibrated to neo-Aristotelian humanism, Nussbaum re-creates a cannon of (largely 
nineteenth century) realist fiction as the list of works for the moral edification of young 
minds. Furthermore, with regards to other forms of writing such as lyric poetry, for instance, 
which she does briefly address in Poetic Justice, they are relevant for Nussbaum only insofar 
as they are committed “both to narrative and to the concrete depiction of different ways of 
life” (1995, 7; Nussbaum chooses to discuss Walt Whitman’s 1855 long, narrative poem, 
“Song of Myself”). Indeed, in Nussbaum’s conception of literary ethics the possibilities of 
other literary forms which might subvert “the bonds of identification and sympathy” (1995, 
7), and propose alternative reader-relations through their experimentation, are considerably 
curtailed. 
 Despite these limitations, Nussbaum’s account of the “narrative imagination” (1995, 
95) is an important contribution to debates concerning the ethics of literature. The “play back 
and forth” that she describes in the narrative form – a movement between the universal and 
the particular – has indeed, even over a more complicated history of the novel than 
Nussbaum allows, been “built into the very structure of the genre” (1995, 8). Furthermore, 
whilst Nussbaum’s literary ethics prescribes a selective literary cannon, it also paradoxically 
follows the first and second wave identity politics of cultural theory to open up the canon to 
minority and marginalised voices. Ultimately, it is through such stories that we do in fact 
develop in Nussbaum’s humanities program, “the ability to imagine sympathetically the 
predicament of another person,” and by their inclusion, to “address particular cultural blind 
spots” (2010, 108). 
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The critical moment made sharply visible by the 1983 New Literary History special 
issue was the catalyst for what has since become known in its broader context as the “turn to 
ethics” in literary criticism. Yet for those of a poststructuralist persuasion, the reputation of 
ethics as a whole remains tarnished, and is derided for its transcendental appeal (as explored 
in the next section) or universal claims (as Nussbaum risks) before being ultimately side-
lined as pre-“Theory”, naïve and dogmatic in its essentialism. For others, ethical criticism has 
increasingly triumphed as the dominant and mainstream practice, establishing a neo-humanist 
reconsideration of the moral compass of the author central to the ethics of reading. But 
perhaps for too many, unsure of the shifting ground of post-millennial ontological and textual 
parameters in the making of both subjectivity and meaning, the ethical imperative is the last, 
and unspoken, white elephant. Nonetheless, the evaluative, narrative mode of literary ethics 
is the hallmark of the philosophical co-disciplinarity provided by Nussbaum. By choosing to 
focus on the novels of Henry James, as she suggested in her reflections in 2009 for New 
Literary History, Ralph Cohen also “steered the debate... to a close affiliation with the revival 
of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics” (762). 
 
Negotiating the Ethical Turn: Emmanuel Levinas’ “Ethics as First Philosophy” 
It was around the turn of the millennium that the debate over the “turn to ethics” split wide 
open. Lawrence Buell’s introduction to a PMLA special issue in 1999 on “Ethics and Literary 
Study” challenged the notion of a “unitary ethics movement,” describing instead a richly 
detailed “pluriform discourse” that “interweaves many genealogical strands” (7). A year later 
he wrote of a “groundswell of still uncertain magnitude” in a collection of essays on The 
Turn to Ethics (2000, 1). By 2004, for Michael Eskin the study of literary ethics had 
“unquestionably consolidated into a burgeoning subdiscipline” (557). Another year later, 
Stephen K. George claimed in his introduction to the second edition of Ethics, Literature, and 
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Theory: An Introductory Reader that “we are indeed on the cusp of an ethical renaissance 
within literary-philosophical studies” (2005, xvi). And yet with any critical excitement what 
are claimed to be radical “turns” are often no more than mere cycles of fashion, modes of 
criticism that take prominence and precedent according to political positioning and 
persuasion. Even then, as Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack explain in their preface to 
Mapping the Ethical Turn: A Reader in Ethics, Culture, and Literary Theory: “ethical critics, 
like cartographers, do not necessarily discover or make a territory but, instead, describe and 
give shape to what has always existed” (2001, ix).  
In the light of the remarkable dominance of the ethical and its privileged valence as a 
central term in contemporary literary critical discourse Eskin’s re-contextualization of the 
perceived double “turn” of the 1980s – “a ‘turn to ethics’ in literary studies and, conversely, a 
‘turn to literature’ in (moral) philosophy” (2004, 557) – retains an instructive cautionary 
force. Introducing the 2004 special issue of Poetics Today, Eskin reminds us once again that, 
“philosophy – of which ethics is a branch, of course – and (the study of) literature have been 
more or less overtly enmeshed since, at the very least, Plato’s reflections on the subject” 
(559). Indeed, Eskin is astute to note that there has been no “(radical) veering off from 
hitherto accepted intellectual practices implied in the notion of ‘turn’” (558). But more than 
this, the popular ethical readings of the post-millennial era have in fact revealed a deeply held 
conservatism – a discipline that persists with its essential epistemological scaffolding intact 
despite its many post-structural deconstructions. Writing out such philosophical problems, a 
smooth continuum is doctored to reinforce a tradition extending through philosophy and 
literature since Plato and aiming to re-stake the center ground of literary studies. The popular 
reification of the “ethical turn” marks most dramatically then a reactionary defensiveness 
within and now across modern literary studies. Self-conscious of the way in which the 
discipline has to some extent perpetuated political apathy within the corridors of its own 
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determinately “postmodern” cultural studies, it has needed a “turn to ethics” in order to renew 
a sense of its own purpose and agency. No longer a subdiscipline, ethical reading has 
saturated the market place to become the thematic mainstay of the interpretative frameworks 
in literary and cultural studies. With this trend there has been a remarkable publishing 
profligacy, as a wave of monographs, edited collections and anthologies have revisited 
literary history, reading “the ethical” into each period, movement, and genre.4 
Yet Nussbaum’s model of the “narrative imagination” (2010, 95), and the role of 
empathy in the reading of literary fiction, can only take us so far in the pursuit of an ethics of 
literature. For in the play of the imagination a capacity for empathetic feeling is developed, 
but in projecting into the Other a human dignity, it is also a projection of the same – the same 
rhetorical, cognitive, and conceptual systems of thinking – the same paradigms and binaries 
of the present social realities. Indeed, the limitations of Nussbaum’s Aristotelian procedure 
are revealed by the very terms in which it is described. For example, she describes how a 
comparative assessment of “the major alternative views” – “holding them up, in each case, 
against our own experience and our intuitions” – can only imagine a “revise[d] overall 
picture so as to bring it into harmony with itself, preserving, as Aristotle says, ‘the greatest 
number and the most basic’ of the original judgments and perceptions” (1990, 174). In other 
words, Nussbaum’s ethics can only harmonize and accommodate different behaviors into the 
same moral order. Thus her claim falls down that “The procedure is holistic: it holds nothing 
unrevisable,” for she has to admit that it also “seeks for coherence and ‘fit’ in the system as a 
whole” (174). Where the individual is confronted with an alternative view or lifestyle that is 
so radically different as to require “improvising resourcefully in response to the new 
perceived thing”, ethical assessment must come down to the “discrimination” that 
Nussbaum’s Aristotle suggests “lies in perception” (182). However, Nussbaum here fails to 
recognize that the cognitive vision of such a “perception” is structured according to the ego’s 
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ontological mode of thinking; it does not challenge the ethical at the level of the structural 
grammar of its phenomenological form. The final “perceptive equilibrium” (182) that 
Nussbaum promotes is a bringing into alignment, or even (as for Booth) holding in 
contradiction, forms of behavior that fit with the ego’s structures of perception. In its most 
extreme form this mode of perception, intended as a positive ethical capability, legitimates 
acts of cognitive violence against the other – appropriating the other through knowledge of 
their difference into a predetermined moral order. 
Nussbaum perhaps recognizes these limitations herself when she describes the need 
for “an unsteady oscillation between blindness and openness, exclusivity and general 
concern, fine reading of life and the immersion of love” (1990, 190). Indeed, exceeding the 
limits of Nussbaum’s ethics there is an extra interpretive or reflective obligation on the reader 
that is beyond the limits of the Aristotelian procedure (the novelist, Nussbaum concludes, 
cannot “have an intimate personal life and still see for us all” [190]). Here, at the limits of the 
permissible in her philosophical writing, Nussbaum is indebted to the much more recent 
philosophical thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). In particular, Nussbaum engages 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953) as she works through several complex 
arguments in The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy 
(1986) and continues to refer to his philosophical thought throughout Love’s Knowledge. 
Indeed, in both Love’s Knowledge and The Fragility of Goondess, there is a residual desire, 
or ethical excess, that is beyond the scope of Classical philosophy. Nussbaum, less 
consciously than Wittgenstein, is also engaged in the larger project: a quest for truth to de-
shackle ethics from the metaphysical or Platonic universals. As Wittgenstein writes in The 
Blue and the Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’ 
(1958): 
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The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find 
the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigation; 
for it has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant 
the concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of the 
general term. (1958, 19-20) 
Nussbaum shares this emphasis on “concrete cases” and thereby approaches a position on 
epistemology similar to Wittgenstein in which “the speaking of language is part of an activity 
or a form of life,” and where “essence is expressed in grammar” (1953, 23). Language is thus 
at the centre of Wittgenstein’s philosophical thinking because in his quest for truth “grammar 
tells what kind of object anything is.” (1953, 371) And yet, ultimately, Nussbaum uses 
Artistotle to draw a “circle of appearances” and thus predetermines the way of her ontological 
limits, or grammar, of “Being” (in her own terms, “the primacy of perceptive intuition” 
[1990, 141]).  
Finally, Nussbaum’s ethics of reading nowhere allows for an altogether Other; rather, 
it looks for a reciprocity of the same humanism as she has it already proscribed. And yet to be 
truly responsible to our humanity, it is necessary to recognize that what is fundamentally at 
stake in the interhuman encounter is the possibility of personal transformation and a radical 
accountability. It is thus that Nussbaum’s ethics, and the popular neo-humanist approach, is 
limited to defense, criticism, and opposition, rather than enabling radical critique and 
systematic change. Indeed, for Wittgenstein too, it seemed finally impossible “to show the fly 
the way out of the fly-bottle” (1953, 309). 
Whilst there has been some important historicist work in reading the ethical into 
literary history, the current populist neo-Aristotelianism threatens to wear out the thread of a 
more radically engaged ethical turn. Despite the many guides, introductions, and anthologies 
that have transformed this subdiscipline into a mainstream practice, the most serious attempt 
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to advance a post- Structuralist ethics is to be found in the critical monographs (published 
principally in the 1990s) by Simon Critchley (1992), Robert Eaglestone (1997), Jill Robbins 
(1999), and Derek Attridge (2004), as well as in the literary-philosophical collections edited 
by Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (1991), Andrew Hadfield, Dominic Rainsford, 
and Tim Woods (1999), and Rainsford and Woods (1999). Pioneering an alternative cross-
fertilization of literature and philosophy, these critics took up the challenge of re-examining 
the ethics of reading in the light of a philosophical re-orientation of ontology (that is being, or 
self-identity) and ethics. A foundational rethinking, it was developed through the work of the 
Lithuanian-born, French Talmudic-commentator and radical philosopher, Emmanuel 
Levinas, and was intended to enable a renewed politico-ethical engagement for literary 
criticism, without resorting to an uncritical moral absolutism or, indeed, the reflective 
evaluations of a neo-Aristotelian, narrative ethics. 
The ethical turn is made possible because of the fundamental difference at the heart of 
Levinas’s work which is set apart from traditional philosophy and which presents the 
possibility to re-think the ethics of literature. Whilst Nussbaum claims that “the Aristotelian 
procedure begins with a very broad and inclusive question: “How should a human being 
live?”’ (1990, 25) Levinas inaugurates an altogether radically different conception of ethics. 
In fact, Levinas begins before the calculations of traditional moral philosophies – re-
negotiating the virtues of Athenian culture with Plato’s Idea of the Good, in contradistinction 
to the pure self of the Cartesian ego, the sociological implications of Darwin’s natural 
selection, the systemic ethics of Kant’s Utilitarianism, the reliance on the passion of the 
emotions in Hume, the self-interest in Nietzsche’s will-to-power, taking even further the 
insistence on an ethical grounding second as it is to fundamental ontology in Heidegger’s 
Dasein – Levinas begins with the very phenomenology which gives rise to human relations. 
In the daring and provocative Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas argues that the assignation 
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of responsibility is a passivity of support instantiated before the unique presence of an other’s 
face. Here the radical alterity of their difference obligates an ethical relation prior to the 
construction of the ego. It is faced with another human being that oneself is called to speak 
out, a signification that embodies the logos, and ultimately supports the being of the other. 
This foundational, philosophical development is unfolded in his later mature work, Otherwise 
than Being, or Beyond Essence (1974). Crucially, in the re-orientation of ethics prior to 
ontology, Levinas’s philosophy privileges language as inhering an ethical structure in a 
saying which brings neighbors into relation with each other.  
Levinas’s description of the ethical event as the “underlying intention of language” 
(1961, 73) is preferable to Nussbaum’s “perceptive intuition” (1990, 141) because it more 
successfully secures a reliable grounding for ethics that is not bounded or totalizing but is 
nonetheless a call to moral responsibility. In the face-to-face encounter, Levinas explains that 
the ethical saying of language “accomplishes a relation such that the terms are not limitrophe 
within this relation,” and that the other, “despite the relationship with the same, remains 
transcendent to the same” (1961, 39). For Nussbaum too, ethics is an optics, but for Levinas 
“it is a ‘vision’ without image, bereft of the synoptic and totalizing objectifying virtues of 
vision, a relation or an intentionality of a wholly different type” (1961, 24). The quest for 
truth in a Levinasian ethics is thus in opposition to the epistemology of Nussbaum’s account, 
making its transcendental appeal in “the presence of infinity breaking the close circle of 
totality” (Levinas, 1961, 171). Levinas’s focus on the other, rather than on individual well-
being, does not help the argument for a narrative ethics: “the unnarratable other,” Levinas 
concludes, “loses his face as a neighbor in narration” (1974, 166). 
The consequences for literary criticism are profound; Levinas’s reorientation of ethics 
and ontology provides a new phenomenology of the subject – a re-vision of subjectivity and 
deregulation of selfhood – that re-grounds the foundations of political critique. Working on 
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ethics during the 1960s and 1970s, Levinas had laid a parallel philosophical track alongside 
the explosive work of structuralism. Levinas’s philosophy was well-placed historically. As 
Lee Morrissey writes, his “approach prioritizes whatever in the text resists assimilation to the 
same” (2001, 330), and so in its alignment with deconstruction’s decentering practices it also 
attracted Derrida’s critique. As Buell reminds us, “a good deal of the credit must go to 
Derrida for having called the attention of literary scholars to Levinas’s work” (1999, 9). 
Derrida’s long essay “Violence and Metaphysics” carefully engages Levinas’s “ethics as first 
philosophy” questioning the end-point of alterity against what he calls “the finitude of 
meaning” (Derrida, 1978, 127). In fact, Derrida helps to re-commit a Levinasian ethics to its 
political and textual limits.  
With this opening up of the ethical turn, differing interpretations of ethical philosophy 
have since advanced variations in its application to the practice of literary criticism. Indeed, 
in 2004 Derek Attridge argued in The Singularity of Literature that “there is an ethical 
dimension to any act of literary signification” (130) and commentators have recognized that 
“the ethical turn in critical theory,” as Tyler Bradway put forward at the 2010 convention of 
the Northeastern Modern Language Association, “has inspired a reevaluation of literature’s 
capacities to catalyze ethical problematics.” As Carla Serpell summarizes, “Literature is 
structurally suggestive: it affords certain ways of reading” (2008, iii), and these movements 
of reading – a projection onto, or movement into the self/other relation – are its ethical 
modes. Indeed, any poststructuralist ethics must now allow for the multi-dimensionality of 
the textual encounter. Whilst Nussbaum’s ethics of reading supports a realist fiction popular 
in the nineteenth century it has been the mission of creative experimentations of narratology 
and literary form to open up the precincts of language and to challenge the reader to embrace 
more radical subjectivities. In the spaces of alternative reader-relations created by 
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experimental poetics and innovations of prosody, for instance, ethical criticism can interpret 
the proleptic spaces for new relations of the social body.
5
  
This is the promise of what Buell calls the “new ethical criticism” and it is recharged 
in the current need to defend the humanities. As Buell explains, reading becomes an act of 
“conscienceful listening” (1999, 12); for Robert Eaglestone, writing in Ethical Criticism: 
Reading After Levinas (1997), “the ‘saying’ in literature is precisely that uncanny moment 
when… our relation to the logos is interrupted (175). Indeed, following Levinas, as the sign 
achieves its signification so too the commitment of an approach becomes already committed 
to the sum of its readings. As a saying, “distinct from the said” – an “interpretation as 
interruption” (Eaglstone 1997, 165) – ethical criticism ultimately serves the task of breaking 
through sedimented codifications. And yet questions of definition, of course, always persist. 
Whilst Tobin Siebers has focused on community, Derrida on textuality, Foucault on the 
socio-political, and Levinas on the Other, Nussbaum’s “cognitive-evaluative” (2001, 3) 
conception of ethics (extended in her recent work on the emotions) positions “fancy” – the 
“ability to see one thing as another and one thing in another” – “at the heart of the ethical 
life” (1998, 349). Nussbaum foregrounds the work of “projection,” but it is a hermeneutics 
not dissimilar to the totalizing western rationalisations that Levinas critiques, for “difference” 
in her accounts is based on “social circumstances” rather than any innate singularity (349). 
Nussbaum writes, “participants look not for a view that is true by correspondence to some 
extra-human reality, but for the best overall fit between a view and what is deepest in human 
lives” (1990, 26). This fanciful “projection” marks a fundamental line of departure between 
Nussbaum and Levinas. For Levinas, ethics is other-oriented (the Other ruptures the self-
same as the originary imperative of the ethical) whereas for Nussbaum, ethics begins and is 
ordered according to the self (the individual subject is autonomous). “Emotions focus on our 
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own goals,” Nussbaum writes, “they represent the world from the point of view of those 
goals and projects” (2001, 7).  
 
Conclusion: Towards a Textual Ethics for the Twenty-First Century 
Throughout human cultural history the question of ethics has remained insistent: it has 
preoccupied our best writers, it is seen throughout the changing practices of literary criticism, 
and it registers in the adapting forms of literary studies. To save ethics in the meta-language 
of literary criticism is not to advocate an evangelical fundamentalism or doctrinal moral 
absolutism, but rather to suggest that literary criticism can thicken or “rough-up” the rarefied 
aesthetic pleasures of the sublime by intellectually engaging in the fullest relation in the 
axiom of the reader-text-world, that is, between representations of the self, other, and their 
subjectification (or socialization) within – to use a Marxist vocabulary – the political 
economy of the text and its conditions of production. Thus in a book “chart[ing] the course of 
criticism into the 1990’s and beyond,” Ralph Cohen suggests that above all else literary 
theory can and ought to be “a personal and public commitment to ethical and literary values” 
(1989, xx). Indeed, the ambitions towards an expanded definition of textual meaning as an 
ethical stance of political engagement is already evident in Rita Felski’s question as the 
current editor of New Literary History: “How can we do justice to both their [artworks’] 
singularity and their worldliness?” (2011, 576). Whilst the mirror alignment of subjectivities 
afforded by the realist structure of mimesis tends to limit our reading practices within the 
parameters of ontological, identity thinking, other structural experimentations of narratology 
and semiotics will on occasions push through the limits of moral reasoning into new relations 
of community. Felski recognizes that “texts are objects that do a lot of travelling”; their 
textual meaning is in part defined across “transtemporal connection[s] and comparison” 
(580). Literature’s ethical imperative may find its political force for a “text’s sociability… is 
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not an attrition, diminution, or co-option of its agency, but the very precondition of it” (589). 
It is only in expanding our notion of textual meaning – attentive to its material witness as 
much as to the form and force of its argument – that the ethical dimensions of the literary text 
are approached; for bodies touch in the thinking of intersubjectivity, a human relation with 
attendant ethical responsibilities. We need, in short, an attentiveness to form, to aesthetics, as 
witness within the socialization (context). It is thus that the experimental work of literature 
and the commitment of literary criticism work towards the futurity of the proleptic, to new 
forms of community and social possibility. 
The departments of literature that turned to the philosophy represented by “academic 
postmodernism,” were in Nussbaum’s estimation in 2009, “no help to the movement Ralph 
encouraged us to start.” Indeed, Ralph’s “countercultural vision,” she has suggested, “has not 
been fully realized” (764). Whilst Nussbaum mourns the neglect of the moral philosophers 
John Rawls, Bernard Williams, and John McDowell, the contributions of Levinasian ethical 
critics are similarly written out in the dominant trend of neo-Aristotelian, narrative ethics. As 
David Davies and Carl Matheson observe in Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of 
Literature: An Analytic Approach (2008), “there has been lamentably little critical 
engagement of this sort between the different philosophical traditions” (xvi). The work of 
ethics, however, always compels us to a mutual engagement and Nussbaum and Levinas both 
necessarily deal with the foundational and troubling question posed by the face-to-face 
experience. “We see personlike shapes all around us,” Nussbaum writes, “but how do we 
relate to them?” (1998, 349) Indeed, it is at the epistemological limits of her thought that 
Nussbaum shares in a wonder of the ethical saying, that primordial phenomenon of the 
other’s alterity in language as it is described by Levinas. She notes, for instance, “the 
physical texture of language, teasing and caressing the reader” (1995, 40). In a Levinasian 
literary ethics the “textual encounter” is, as Buell has observed, a “personal encounter” 
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(1999, 13), and the rosette or love-knot of phenomenological exegesis (to which Levinas’s 
writing aspires) is, perhaps, that physical quality of language described by Nussbaum as a 
“flexible and acrobatic circus body” (1995, 40). 
Levinas’s thesis is an emancipatory activism in phenomenological thought and yet it 
is presently unfashionable and largely marginalized within the current trend of ethical 
criticism. Fearful perhaps that its more difficult thinking would only further trouble the 
embattled subjectivity – already up against its own self-critical skepticism – the critic writing 
in the post-millennial era has typically found other more comfortable modes of engagement 
or favored the displacement activity of a surface rhetoric of literary aesthetics.
6
 Yet Levinas’s 
work revised the Western philosophical tradition to put a responsibility for the other before 
the freedom of the subject and the challenge today is to break through polarized ethical 
philosophies and competing critical camps. As Nancy Glazener observes of the rift between 
Analytic and Continental philosophy, what is required is “an event which would not be the 
triumph of either but the possibility of something new” (2005, 51). 
Following Levinas’s “ethics as first philosophy” (1989, 75), literary criticism is a 
work that must fracture the sedimented narratives of literary and cultural history to bring a 
renewed attentiveness or ethical witness in dialectic with the subject-positioning of a said 
text. Attending to the ethical potential rather than the social purpose of literature it may 
counter-balance what Drew Milne observes: “temptations either to put too much emphasis on 
historical and intellectual contexts, or to develop too quickly into theoretical formalism or 
conceptual abstraction” (2010, 33). Indeed, ethical criticism needs to extend Levinas’s 
account of the phenomenology of the face-to-face experience in language in order to 
understand reading as a textual encounter (the structural relation between self and other) and 
thus the basis by which aesthetics is ethics. At the same time, ethical criticism can draw on 
Nussbaum’s Aristotelian approach in order to allow for an evaluation of the imagined forms 
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of the face-to-face encounter, where ethics also is a public responsibility to the said text (as 
Levinas writes, “Truth takes form in this response to a summons” [1961, 244]). Any reading 
that takes forward an ethical imperative must be attentive both to the singularity of textual 
aesthetics (its transformative or affective capacities) and to the politics of its social or 
historical context. Whilst their philosophical rationale differs, the possibility for a shared 
ethics emerges in Nussbaum’s attempt to “imagine language as a way of touching a human 
body” (1995, 41). Here interdisciplinary literary studies can begin again towards a textual 
ethics for the twenty-first century, and recommit a literary criticism that is altogether 
different from the rhetorical language of a disinterested aestheticism for it must be first of all 
attendant to its ethical responsibilities. Indeed, despite his transcendental appeal, both 
Nussbaum and Levinas started this vital work towards an ethics which is material and this-
worldly, “restoring our love and attention,” as Nussbaum writes, “to the phenomena of daily 
life” (2001, 15). 
 
                                                        
1
 With a view to civic responsibility, Nussbaum’s “Aristotelian procedure” provides four 
qualities for “readership”: fancy, the imaginative capacity which constructs and projects 
humanity onto another; sympathy, a compassion for the suffering of others and a joy in their 
well-being; autonomy, viewing the other as having a separate and single life; and, judicious 
spectatorship, the evaluative deliberations essential to critique (1995, 76). 
2
 In her review of Booth’s The Company We Keep, Nussbaum simply refutes the literality of 
his claim by explaining, “I can treat a book as I would never think it right to treat a real live 
person” (1989, 176). 
3
 Three points in particular retain their acuity: first, Posner argues that “the novel is certainly 
a more bourgeois medium” than Nussbaum allows (and, indeed, one need only look to the 
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formation of a cannon for conclusive evidence); second, that “immersion in literature does 
not make us better citizens” (an almost impossible assertion to prove); and, third, that 
Nussbaum’s discrimination of literary merit threatens “lists of edifying works of literature” 
(though Posner also risks a partisan elitism). Elsewhere in the debate there is much confusion 
– including recognition on both sides that once again what is most at variance is the 
definition of terms – as well as occasional inadvertent agreements. In the exchange, for 
instance, Posner suggests that “the aesthetic outlook is a moral outlook,” and that “literature 
helps us make sense of our lives, helps us to fashion an identity for ourselves” (1997, 7). 
4
 To name just a few notable recent contributions include, for example, Edwin Craun, Ethics 
and Power in Medieval English Reformist Writing (2010); Andrew Miller, The Burdens of 
Perfection: On Ethics and Reading in Nineteenth-Century British Literature (2008); Jil 
Larson, Ethics and Narrative in the English Novel, 1880-1914 (2001; 2009); Jeffrey 
Karnicky, Contemporary Fiction and the Ethics of Modern Culture (2007). 
5
 The formal experimentation of literary production thus emerges as an ethical imperative; in 
the discourse of modern poetics, “in order to live not solipsistically, but interestedly” as the 
poet Rachel Blau DuPlessis puts it, and to “instantiate a distance from regular poetic practice 
and its subjectivities… as in exile from these” (2010, n.p.). 
6
 In “Close but not deep: Literary Ethics and the Descriptive Turn,” Heather Love describes a 
shift from what she calls a “depth hermeneutics” to the “description of surfaces” (2010, 375). 
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